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+ Huberman, Bernardo A. and Glance, Natalie S. (1993) 'Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 90(16), August, pp. 7716-7718.

Ikegami, Takashi (1993) 'Ecology of Evolutionary Game Strategies', in [ECAL 93], pp. 527-536.

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Kandori, Michihiro, Mailath, George J. and Rob, Rafael (1993) 'Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games', Econometrica, 61(1), January, pp. 29-56. [Games are played recurrently and individuals have information about the past play of the game, based on which they form beliefs about how their opponents will play and choose a best response to these beliefs. The chosen actions add to the history of play. Each player plays every other in every period. Successful strategies are adopted with higher probabilities than unsuccessful ones and there is a small probability of mistakes. The stochastic process selects the risk dominant Nash equilibrium when the mistake probability is small.] [JSTOR] [*0]

! Kelley, H. H. and Stahelski, A. J. (1970) 'Social Interaction Basis of Cooperators' and Competitors' Beliefs About Others', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16(xx), xx, pp. 66-91. [*0]

Kreps, David M. (1990) Game Theory and Economic Modelling (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Kreps, David M. and Fudenberg, Drew (1988) Learning, Experimentation, and Equilibrium in Games (Cambridge, MA: The M. I. T. Press). [*0]

Kreps, David M., Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John, and Wilson, R. (1982) 'Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma', Journal of Economic Theory, 27(xx), xx, pp. 245-252. [Assume incomplete information and relax the assumption that rationality is common knowledge.] [*0]

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Liebrand, Wim B. G. (1984) 'The Effect of Social Motives, Communication and Group Size on Behaviour in an N-Person Multi Stage Mixed Motive Game', European Journal of Social Psychology, 14(xx), xx, pp. 239-264. [*0]

Liebrand, Wim B. G., Messick, David M. and Wilke, H. (eds.) (1992) Social Dilemmas: Theoretical Issues and Research Findings (Oxford: Pergamon Press). [*0]

Liebrand, Wim B. G. and Messick, David M. (eds.) (1996) Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research (Berlin: Springer-Verlag). [*0] [C]

Lindgren, Kristian and Nordahl, Mats G. (1993) 'Evolutionary Dynamics of Spatial Games', in Self Organization and Life: From Simple Rules to Global Complexity, Proceedings of the Second European Conference on Artificial Life, Brussels, Belgium 24-26 May 1993 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 604-616.

Lomborg, Bjo/rn (1992) 'Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma', Papers on Economics and Evolution, Number 9302, edited by the European Study Group for Evolutionary Economics.

* Lomborg, Bjo/rn (1993) 'The Structure of Solutions in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma', Draft Paper, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, February.

Lomborg, Bjo/rn (1996) 'Nucleus and Shield: The Evolution of Social Structure in the Interated Prisoner's Dilemma', American Sociological Review, 61(2), April, pp. 278-307. [JSTOR] [BOX05] [*0]

Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions (New York, NY: Wiley).

Mailath, George J. (1992) 'Introduction: Symposium on Evolutionary Game Theory', Journal of Economic Theory, 57(xx), xx, pp. 259-277. [*0]

+ Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry and Shaked, Avner (1992) 'Evolution and Endogenous Interaction', Draft Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, latest version 24 August 1995. [D PS] [This paper is also known as 'The Evolution of Heterogeneity', 'Evolution with Endogenous Interactions' and 'Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium'.]

Macy, Michael (1989) 'Walking Out of Social Traps: A Stochastic Learning Model for the Prisoner's Dilemma', Rationality and Society, 1(2), xx, pp. 197-219. [*0]

+ Marks, Robert E. (1989) 'Niche Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments Revisited', AGSM Working Paper 89-009, Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales. [Uses GA on finite automata rather than human tournaments to evolve good PD strategies, replicating Axelrod's work from 1987 but also developing it to deal with noisy PD games. A niche is defined as an unchanging environment rather than a co-evolving population of rivals. Those niches studied are C, D, TFT, Axelrod 5-rule (with and without a small chance that players will misobserve their opponents previous play) and Axelrod 8-rule.]

Marti/nez-Coll, Juan Carlos (1986) 'A Bioeconomic Model of Hobbes' State of Nature', Social Science Information, 25(2), June, pp. 493-505. [*0]

Marti/nez-Coll, Juan Carlos and Hirshleifer, Jack (1991) 'The Limits of Reciprocity: Solution Concepts and Reactive Strategies in Evolutionary Equilibrium Models', Rationality and Society, 3(1), January, pp. 35-64. [*0]

Marti/nez-Coll, Juan Carlos and Hirshleifer, Jack (1992) 'The Limits of Reciprocity Reaffirmed', Rationality and Society, 4(2), April, pp. xxx-xxx. [*0]