This bibliography also contains important references on Game Theory in general. Fascination with the Prisoner's Dilemma has resulted in a study area where both mathematical and computational approaches can fruitfully interact.

Abreu, Dilip and Rubinstein, Ariel (1988) 'The Structure of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Finite Automata', Econometrica, 56(6), November, pp. 1259-1281.

Adachi, N. and Matsuo, K. (1991) 'Ecological Dynamics Under Different Selection Rules in Distributed and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games', Parallel Problem Solving From Nature, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 496 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), pp. 388-394.

Anderlini, Luca (1989) 'Some Notes on Church's Thesis and the Theory of Games', Theory and Decision, 29(1), pp. 19-52.

Anderlini, Luca and Sabourian, Hamid (1989) 'Computability and Infinitely Repeated Common Interest Games with No Discounting', Draft Paper, Cambridge University.

Arthur, W. Brian (1989a) 'Nash Discovering Automata for Finite Action Games', Working Paper, Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico.

+ Axelrod, Robert M. and Dion, Douglas (1988) 'The Further Evolution of Cooperation', Science, 242(4884), 9 December, pp. 1385-1390. [Analyses developments in the evolution of co-operation, investigating work varying the number of players, the range of possible choices, variations in the payoff structure, noise, the shadow of the future, population dynamics and population structure.]

Axelrod, Robert M. and Hamilton, William D. (1981) 'The Evolution of Cooperation', Science, 211(4489), pp. 1390-1396.

Aumann, Robert (1981) 'Repeated Games', in Feiwel, G. R. (ed.) Issues in Contemporary and Welfare (London: Macmillan), pp. 209-242. [First use of finite automata in game theory.]

Bacharach, Michael (1993) 'Variable Universe Games', in Binmore, K. et al. (eds.) Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press).

Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Weibull, Jo:rgen W. (1993) 'Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players', Research Paper in Economics, University of Stockholm.

Banks, J. and Sundaram, R. (1990) 'Repeated Games, Finite Automata and Complexity', Games and Economic Behaviour, 2, pp. 97-117.

Basar, T. and Olsder, G.J. (1982) Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory (New York, NY: Academic Press).

Ben-Porath, E. (1987) 'Repeated Games with Finite Automata', Technical Report Number 515, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, August.

Bergin, J. and Lipman, B. (1996) 'Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations', Econometrica, 64, pp. 943-956. [The result of Kandori, Mailath and Rob turns out to depend on mutation rates that do not vary "too much", across the different states of the adaptation process. If mutation rates in different states are not taken to zero at the same rate, then by appropriate choice of rates, any desired strict equilibrium may be selected in the long run.]

Binmore, Ken (1987) 'Modeling Rational Players I', Economics and Philosophy, 3(2), pp. 179-214. [A detailed analysis of bounded rationality, with particular reference to game theory, which urges a programme of research into the thinking processes of game players to model rationality better.]

Binmore, Ken (1988) 'Modelling Rational Players II', Economics and Philosophy, 4(1), pp. 9-55. [A detailed analysis of bounded rationality, with particular reference to game theory, which urges a programme of research into the thinking processes of game players to model rationality better.]

Binmore, Ken (1994) Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair (Cambridge, MA: The M. I. T. Press). [Reinterprets classical social contract ideas within a game theoretic framework, building on a synthesis of the theories of John Rawls and John Harsanyi. Introduces elementary notions of game theory and implications for social contract issues. Critiques the leading arguments that have been offered in defence of the fallacy that co-operation is rational in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Provides an exposition of orthodox decision theory and presents a critique of the thick veils of ignorance proposed by Harsanyi and Rawls. In contrast, suggests a thin veil of ignorance in which persons are not called upon to forget the way society is currently organised or their empathetic preferences, which are shaped by social evolution in the medium run. The second volume of Game Theory and the Social Contract will address the problem of bargaining behind the veil of ignorance.]

+ Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1991) 'Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata', Journal of Economic Theory, 57, pp. 278-305.

Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1993) 'Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection', Discussion Paper, University of Wisconsin.

Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1994) 'An Economic Perspective on the Evolution of Norms', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150(1), pp. 45-63.

Binmore, Ken, Samuelson, Larry and Vaughan, Richard (1994) 'Musical Chairs: Modelling Noisy Evolution', Discussion Paper 94-13, Department of Economics, UCL October.

Bjo:rnerstedt, J. and Weibull, J. (1993) 'Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation', in Arrow, K. and Colombatto, E. (eds.) Rationality in Economics (New York, NY: Macmillan).