Bolle, Friedel and Ockenfels, Peter (1990) 'Prisoner's Dilemma as a Game of Incomplete Information', Journal of Economic Psychology, 11, pp. 69-84. [*0]

+ Bonanno, Giacomo and Nehring, Klaus (1996) 'Fundamental Agreement: A New Foundation for the Harsanyi Doctrine', Working Paper Series Number 96-02, Department of Economics, University of California (Davis), February. ["There exists an important and troublesome tension within the Bayesian approach to game theory and economics. From the point of view of their decision-theoretic foundation ... probabilities are subjective, representing personal judgements on the comparative likelihood of events revealed in an agent's preferences over bets or "acts". Personal probability judgments admit two types of determinants, objective and subjective; call them "experience" and "mind-set". On the other hand, in game-theoretic and economic applications, with few exceptions, only the first type of determinant is allowed to matter. Thus, differences of beliefs are attributed entirely to differences in experience ("Harsanyi Doctrine"); correspondingly, agents are assumed to be "like minded". Following Harsanyi ... "like-mindedness" is commonly formalised by assuming agents' beliefs to be posteriors derived from a commonly known common prior."]

Bo:rgers, Tilman and Sarin, R. (1993) 'Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics', Technical Report, University College London.

Bo:rgers, Tilman and Sarin, R. (1996a) 'Naive Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics', ELSE Working Paper.

Bo:rgers, Tilman and Sarin, R. (1996b) 'Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics', ELSE Working Paper.

Boyd, Robert and Lorberbaum, Jeffrey P. (1987) 'No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game', Nature, 327, 7 May, pp. 58-59.

Boylan, Richard T. (1991) 'Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals', Journal of Economic Theory, 57, pp. 473-504. [Biologists and economists have analyzed populations where each individual interacts with randomly selected individuals. The random matching generates a very complicated stochastic system. Consequently evolutionary biologists have approximated such a system by a deterministic system. The justification of such an approximation is that the population is assumed to be very large and thus some law of large numbers must hold. In this paper we give an example for which this assumption does not hold. We then show that if we assume that the population is infinite then the stochastic and the deterministic system are the same. Finally, we show that if the process lasts finitely many periods and if the population is large enough then the deterministic model offers a good approximation of the stochastic model. In doing so we make precise what we mean by population, matching process, and evolution of the population.]

Braithwaite, R. B. (1955) The Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Brams, S. J. (1993) 'Theory of Moves', American Scientist, 81, pp. 562-570.

Brandenburger, Adam and Dekel, Eddie (1989) 'The Role of Common Knowledge Assumptions in Game Theory', in Hahn, Frank H. (ed.) The Economics of Missing Markets, Information and Games (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 46-61.

* Brenner, Thomas (1998) 'Cognitive Models and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games', Paper presented at the Workshop Agent-Based and Population-Based Modelling of Learning in Economics, Max-Planck-Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Germany, 2nd - 3rd March. [Draft: Do Not Quote Or Distribute.]

Busch, Marc L. and Reinhardt, Eric R. (1993) Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Co-operation under Anarchy, Journal-of-Conflict-Resolution, 37(3), September, pp. 427-445. [The debate between neo-liberals and realists in the field of international relations draws heavily on the findings offered in Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Co-operation. Axelrod's well-known argument is that co-operation can emerge among egoists despite the absence of a central authority. This article assesses the robustness of Axelrod's findings in light of the realist critique that relative gains concerns make co-operation less likely than neo-liberals contend. We build on an amended prisoner's dilemma (PD) game and conduct a computer simulation tournament in which we vary (1) the payoff structure and (2) Axelrod's population of strategies. The results indicate that co-operation can emerge even under strong relative gains concerns, so long as the population of strategies is sufficiently retaliatory. On the basis of this finding, we argue that the realist critique is overstated: the introduction of greater relative gains concerns does not necessarily limit the prospects for co-operation among states.]

Cabrales, A. and Ponti, G. (1996) 'Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics', ELSE Working Paper.

Canning, David (1988) 'Rationality and Game Theory When Players are Turing Machines', ST/ICERD Discussion Paper 88/183, London School of Economics, London.

Canning, David (1990c) 'Rationality, Computability and the Limits of Game Theory', Economic Theory Discussion Paper Number 152, Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, July.

Canning, David (1992) 'Rationality, Computability and Nash Equilibrium', Econometrica, 60(4), July, pp. 877-888.

Cho, I.-K. and Kreps, David M. (1987) 'Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(1), February, pp. 179-221. [*0]

Cowan, Robin A. and Miller, John H. (1990) 'Economic Life on a Lattice: Some Game Theoretic Results', Working Paper 90-010, Economics Research Program, Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico. [*0]